Post by Rev. Dr. Red on May 8, 2012 21:08:29 GMT -5
From WhiteNationalism.com
The White Nationalist Premise
The premise behind White Nationalism is quite simple.
Including more than one race in a single country produces conflict.
The moral thing to do in such cases is to reduce conflict by giving each race its own nation.
Egalitarianism and integrationism are moral contrivances of elites wishing to maintain governmental power and low wage rates.
It is really that simple!
Modern elites have two strategies for holding multi-racial empires together:
- Massive Repression, as in the old Soviet Union and in communist Yugoslavia.
- Racial preference schemes to achieve "social cohesion" by preferring one group over another. (Malaysia, India, China, United States, Canada, South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Sri Lanka).
Racial preference schemes reward racial anger.
The race with the most anger is the one that will get the greatest government benefits through racial preferences. Thus, the existence of these preferences sets off a scramble among competing racial groups to display more racial anger than other competing groups.
The group that displays the least anger is the one on whom the greatest burdens will be placed.
The factual argument for White Nationalism has been stated best by Thomas Sowell, a black professor of economics, in his book, "Race and Culture."
The news for liberals is uniformly bad:
- The demand for quotas and preferences comes not from the poor, but from elites within each group.
- The demand for quotas and preferences is accompanied by improved education and rising living standards.
- Political entrepreneurs will often provoke racial animus where none previously existed.
- Racial preferences are uniformly successful at attaining their political aim of reinforcing the power of political elites.
The notion that such social problems will disappear with rising incomes and rising education is contradicted by the evidence. It is increasing education, increased prosperity and increased inter-group contact that produce conflict.
Yggdrasil-
* * * * * * * * *
From Race and Culture
by Thomas Sowell p 141
(Basic Books, c.1994) "Group Polarization Patterns
"Political anger and demands for privileges are, of course, not limited to the less privileged. Indeed, even when demands are made in the name of less privileged racial or ethnic groups, often it is the more privileged members of such groups who make the demands and who benefit from policies designed to meet such demands. These demands may erupt suddenly in the wake of the creation (or sharp enlargement) of a newly educated class which sees its path to coveted middle-class professions blocked by competition of other groups--as in India, French Canada, or Lithuania, for example.38
* * *
"Economics is often the key to such anomalies--and the implications reach well beyond India or Nigeria. Those cities in India with strident political nativist movements demanding preferential treatment for local groups have generally been cities where (1) most of the lower-middle-class positions were held by outside groups and where (2) there were growing numbers of the educated unemployed locally.61 Such movements tend to be disproportionately staffed by, and appeal to, those who are part the first generation of their family to be educated.62 Ironically, it was such people who made Indians their target and prey in East Africa.
A rapid expansion of education is thus a factor in producing intergroup conflict, especially where the education is of a kind which produces diplomas rather than skills that have significant economic value in the marketplace. Education of a sort useful only for being a clerk, bureaucrat, school teacher--jobs whose numbers are relatively fixed in the short run and politically determined in the long run--tend to increase politicized intergroup strife. Yet newly emerging groups, whether in their own countries or abroad, tend to specialize precisely in such undemanding fields. Malay students, for example, have tended to specialize in Malay studies and Islamic studies, which provide them with no skills with which compete with the Chinese in the marketplace, either as businessmen, independent professionals, or technicians. Blacks and Hispanics in the United States follow a very similar pattern of specializing disproportionately in easier fields which offer less in the way of marketable skills. Such groups then have little choice but to turn to the government, not just for jobs but also for group preferences to be imposed in the market place, and for symbolic recognition in various forms.
"Intergroup competition is, in one sense, inevitable in a world without unlimited resources, but the nature and intensity of this competition may be either moderated or accentuated, depending upon the institutions through which it takes place. The marketplace provides incentives for groups to moderate their competing demands upon the resources and output of the economy, because prices serve as an impersonal mechanism to cause self- rationing. Ethnic politics has just the opposite effect. Although politicians do not create economic benefits, they can transfer them, usually below cost and often free to the recipients. Just as prices force self-rationing, freeness permits self-indulgence. Competing demands readily escalate beyond what is available without the constraining effect of price to convey the scarcity and production costs of what is demanded. The inherent constraints of economic life are not removed by political intervention. Rationing among individuals and groups is as much an inherent necessity as ever. The rationing must simply be done by other means such as political struggles, violence, or the threat of violence.
"Politics is not simply a mechanism for resolving existing differences among racial and ethnic groups. Politics can also generate and magnify such conflicts. Groups with little racial or cultural difference, such as the Andhras and the Telanganans in India, [63] may exaggerate what small differences there are, in order to compete for political favors as more or less artificially created social groups. Similarly, more or less "natural" social groups such as the Italians and Greeks in Australia, may make little or no effort to organize politically until after group-based benefits have been proffered by national political parties. [64] There is no such group as "Hispanics" anywhere in the world except in the United States, because only in the U.S. do government programs recognize such a category, thereby leading to political ethnic coalitions to capitalize on government grants and appropriations. In short, political favors are not simply responses to existing groups. The groups themselves may be artifacts created by Political favors-- and, even when not created by these favors, their degree of self- consciousness, politicization, or polarization may be functions of the availability of government largesse. "However detrimental polarization may prove to be to particular groups or to the society as a whole, it may still be beneficial to those in official positions at various levels. In Thailand, for example, the abortive attempt to drive the Chinese out of the rice-exporting business by establishing a government monopoly did not achieve its goal, but did succeed in diverting profits to Thai soldiers, police officials, and politicians, whose cooperation became necessary to allow the Chinese entrepreneur to continue performing a function which only he could perform. [65] Much the same story of corruption and quasi-corruption could be found in Malaysia and Indonesia. [66] It is not at all uncommon for policies to be, simultaneously politically effective and economically counterproductive. In Uganda, the expulsions of the East Indians were so popular that political pressure developed to do the same in neighboring Kenya, even though the economic consequences proved disastrous for Uganda.
"While economic interests are sometimes significant in explaining political decisions, they are by no means universally valid explanations. Educated elites from less advanced groups may have ample economic incentives to promote polarization and preferential treatment policies, but the real question is why the uneducated masses from such groups give them the political support without which they would be impotent. Indeed, it is often the less educated masses who unleash the mob violence from which their elite compatriots ultimately benefit--as in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, or parts of India, Africa, or the United States, where such violence has led to group preference policies in employment, educational institutions, and elsewhere. The common denominator in these highly disparate societies seems to be not only resentment of other groups' success but also fear of an inability to compete with them, combined with a painful embarrassment at being so visibly "under-represented"--or missing entirely--in prestigious occupations and institutions. To remedy this within a politically relevant time horizon requires not simply increased opportunities but earmarked benefits directly given on a racial or ethnic basis. [67]"
The White Nationalist Premise
The premise behind White Nationalism is quite simple.
Including more than one race in a single country produces conflict.
The moral thing to do in such cases is to reduce conflict by giving each race its own nation.
Egalitarianism and integrationism are moral contrivances of elites wishing to maintain governmental power and low wage rates.
It is really that simple!
Modern elites have two strategies for holding multi-racial empires together:
- Massive Repression, as in the old Soviet Union and in communist Yugoslavia.
- Racial preference schemes to achieve "social cohesion" by preferring one group over another. (Malaysia, India, China, United States, Canada, South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Sri Lanka).
Racial preference schemes reward racial anger.
The race with the most anger is the one that will get the greatest government benefits through racial preferences. Thus, the existence of these preferences sets off a scramble among competing racial groups to display more racial anger than other competing groups.
The group that displays the least anger is the one on whom the greatest burdens will be placed.
The factual argument for White Nationalism has been stated best by Thomas Sowell, a black professor of economics, in his book, "Race and Culture."
The news for liberals is uniformly bad:
- The demand for quotas and preferences comes not from the poor, but from elites within each group.
- The demand for quotas and preferences is accompanied by improved education and rising living standards.
- Political entrepreneurs will often provoke racial animus where none previously existed.
- Racial preferences are uniformly successful at attaining their political aim of reinforcing the power of political elites.
The notion that such social problems will disappear with rising incomes and rising education is contradicted by the evidence. It is increasing education, increased prosperity and increased inter-group contact that produce conflict.
Yggdrasil-
* * * * * * * * *
From Race and Culture
by Thomas Sowell p 141
(Basic Books, c.1994) "Group Polarization Patterns
"Political anger and demands for privileges are, of course, not limited to the less privileged. Indeed, even when demands are made in the name of less privileged racial or ethnic groups, often it is the more privileged members of such groups who make the demands and who benefit from policies designed to meet such demands. These demands may erupt suddenly in the wake of the creation (or sharp enlargement) of a newly educated class which sees its path to coveted middle-class professions blocked by competition of other groups--as in India, French Canada, or Lithuania, for example.38
* * *
"Economics is often the key to such anomalies--and the implications reach well beyond India or Nigeria. Those cities in India with strident political nativist movements demanding preferential treatment for local groups have generally been cities where (1) most of the lower-middle-class positions were held by outside groups and where (2) there were growing numbers of the educated unemployed locally.61 Such movements tend to be disproportionately staffed by, and appeal to, those who are part the first generation of their family to be educated.62 Ironically, it was such people who made Indians their target and prey in East Africa.
A rapid expansion of education is thus a factor in producing intergroup conflict, especially where the education is of a kind which produces diplomas rather than skills that have significant economic value in the marketplace. Education of a sort useful only for being a clerk, bureaucrat, school teacher--jobs whose numbers are relatively fixed in the short run and politically determined in the long run--tend to increase politicized intergroup strife. Yet newly emerging groups, whether in their own countries or abroad, tend to specialize precisely in such undemanding fields. Malay students, for example, have tended to specialize in Malay studies and Islamic studies, which provide them with no skills with which compete with the Chinese in the marketplace, either as businessmen, independent professionals, or technicians. Blacks and Hispanics in the United States follow a very similar pattern of specializing disproportionately in easier fields which offer less in the way of marketable skills. Such groups then have little choice but to turn to the government, not just for jobs but also for group preferences to be imposed in the market place, and for symbolic recognition in various forms.
"Intergroup competition is, in one sense, inevitable in a world without unlimited resources, but the nature and intensity of this competition may be either moderated or accentuated, depending upon the institutions through which it takes place. The marketplace provides incentives for groups to moderate their competing demands upon the resources and output of the economy, because prices serve as an impersonal mechanism to cause self- rationing. Ethnic politics has just the opposite effect. Although politicians do not create economic benefits, they can transfer them, usually below cost and often free to the recipients. Just as prices force self-rationing, freeness permits self-indulgence. Competing demands readily escalate beyond what is available without the constraining effect of price to convey the scarcity and production costs of what is demanded. The inherent constraints of economic life are not removed by political intervention. Rationing among individuals and groups is as much an inherent necessity as ever. The rationing must simply be done by other means such as political struggles, violence, or the threat of violence.
"Politics is not simply a mechanism for resolving existing differences among racial and ethnic groups. Politics can also generate and magnify such conflicts. Groups with little racial or cultural difference, such as the Andhras and the Telanganans in India, [63] may exaggerate what small differences there are, in order to compete for political favors as more or less artificially created social groups. Similarly, more or less "natural" social groups such as the Italians and Greeks in Australia, may make little or no effort to organize politically until after group-based benefits have been proffered by national political parties. [64] There is no such group as "Hispanics" anywhere in the world except in the United States, because only in the U.S. do government programs recognize such a category, thereby leading to political ethnic coalitions to capitalize on government grants and appropriations. In short, political favors are not simply responses to existing groups. The groups themselves may be artifacts created by Political favors-- and, even when not created by these favors, their degree of self- consciousness, politicization, or polarization may be functions of the availability of government largesse. "However detrimental polarization may prove to be to particular groups or to the society as a whole, it may still be beneficial to those in official positions at various levels. In Thailand, for example, the abortive attempt to drive the Chinese out of the rice-exporting business by establishing a government monopoly did not achieve its goal, but did succeed in diverting profits to Thai soldiers, police officials, and politicians, whose cooperation became necessary to allow the Chinese entrepreneur to continue performing a function which only he could perform. [65] Much the same story of corruption and quasi-corruption could be found in Malaysia and Indonesia. [66] It is not at all uncommon for policies to be, simultaneously politically effective and economically counterproductive. In Uganda, the expulsions of the East Indians were so popular that political pressure developed to do the same in neighboring Kenya, even though the economic consequences proved disastrous for Uganda.
"While economic interests are sometimes significant in explaining political decisions, they are by no means universally valid explanations. Educated elites from less advanced groups may have ample economic incentives to promote polarization and preferential treatment policies, but the real question is why the uneducated masses from such groups give them the political support without which they would be impotent. Indeed, it is often the less educated masses who unleash the mob violence from which their elite compatriots ultimately benefit--as in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, or parts of India, Africa, or the United States, where such violence has led to group preference policies in employment, educational institutions, and elsewhere. The common denominator in these highly disparate societies seems to be not only resentment of other groups' success but also fear of an inability to compete with them, combined with a painful embarrassment at being so visibly "under-represented"--or missing entirely--in prestigious occupations and institutions. To remedy this within a politically relevant time horizon requires not simply increased opportunities but earmarked benefits directly given on a racial or ethnic basis. [67]"
